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Abstract
We propose a general framework for increasing local stability of Artificial Neural
Nets (ANNs) using Robust Optimization (RO). We achieve this through an alter-
nating minimization-maximization procedure, in which the loss of the network
is minimized over perturbed examples that are generated at each parameter up-
date. We show that adversarial training of ANNs is in fact robustification of the
network optimization, and that our proposed framework generalizes previous ap-
proaches for increasing local stability of ANNs. Experimental results reveal that
our approach increases the robustness of the network to existing adversarial ex-
amples, while making it harder to generate new ones. Furthermore, our algorithm
improves the accuracy of the network also on the original test data.
1 Introduction
The fact that ANNs might by very unstable locally was demonstrated in [21], where it was shown
that highly performing vision ANNs mis-classify examples that have only barely perceivable (by a
human eye) differences from correctly classified examples. Such examples are called adversarial
examples, and were originally found by solving an optimization problem, with respect to a trained
net. Adversarial examples do not tend to exist naturally in training and test data. Yet, the local
instability manifested by their existence is somewhat disturbing. In the case of visual data, for ex-
ample, one would expect that images that are very close in the natural “human eye” metric will be
mapped to nearby points in the hidden representation spaces, and consequently will be predicted
to the same class. Moreover, it has been shown that different models with different architectures
which are trained on different training sets tend to mis-classify the same adversarial examples in a
similar fashion. In addition to the disturbing existence of adversarial examples from model stability
perspective, the fact that they can be generated by simple and structured procedures and are com-
mon to different models can be used to perform attacks on models by making them fail easily and
consistently [8].
It has been claimed that adversarial examples exist in ’blind spots’ in the data domain in which
training and testing data do not occur naturally; however, some of these blind spots might be very
close in some sense to naturally occurring data.
Several works have proposed to use adversarial examples during training of ANNs, and reported
increase in classification accuracy on test data (for example, [21], [7]). The goal of this manuscript
is to provide a framework that yields a full theoretical understanding of adversarial training, as well
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as new optimization schemes, based on robust optimization. Specifically, we show that generating
and using adversarial examples during training of ANNs can be derived from the powerful notion of
Robust Optimization (RO), which has many applications in machine learning and is closely related
to regularization. We propose a general algorithm for robustification of ANN training, and show that
it generalizes previously proposed approaches.
Essentially, our algorithm increases the stability of ANNs with respect to perturbations in the input
data, through an iterative minimization-maximization procedure, in which the network parameters
are updated with respect to worst-case data, rather than to the original training data. Furthermore,
we show connections between our method and existing methods for generating adversarial examples
and adversarial training, demonstrating that those methods are special instances of the robust opti-
mization framework. This point yields a principled connection highlighting the fact that the existing
adversarial training methods aim to robustify the parameter optimization process.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in Section 2 we mention some of the recent works that
analyze adversarial examples and attempt to improve local stability. In Section 3 we present the
basic ideas behind Robust Optimization, and some of its connections to regularization in machine
learning models. In Section 4 we present our training framework, some of its possible variants and
its practical version. Experimental results are given in Section 5. Section ?? briefly concludes this
manuscript.
1.1 Notation
We denote a labeled training set by {(xi, yi)}mi=1 where xi ∈ Rd is a set of features and yi ∈{1, ..,K} is a label. The loss of a network with parameters θ on (x, y) is denoted by J(θ, x, y)
and is a function that quantifies the goodness-of-fit between the parameters θ and the observations
(x, y). When holding θ and y fixed and viewing J(θ, x, y) as a function of x we occasionally write
Jθ,y(x). ∆x ∈ Rd corresponds to a small additive adversarial perturbation, that is to be added to
x. By adversarial example we refer to the perturbed example, i.e., x˜i = x + ∆x, along with the
original label y. We denote the `p norm for 1 ≤ p < ∞ to be ‖x‖pp =
∑d
j=1 |x(i)|p and denote
the `∞ norm of a vector x to be ‖x‖∞ = maxi{|x(i)|}. Given two vectors x and y the Euclidean
inner-product is denoted 〈x, y〉 = xT y = ∑i xiyi. Given a function f(x, y), we denote ∇xf(x, y)
to be the gradient of f with respect to the vector x.
2 Related Work
Adversarial examples were first introduced in [21], where they were generated for a given training
point (x, y) by using L-BFGS (see [23], for example) to solve the box-constrained optimization
problem
min
∆x
c‖∆x‖2 + J(θ, x+ ∆x, y′) (1)
subject to x+ ∆x ∈ [0, 1]d,
and y′ 6= y. A similar approach for generating adversarial examples was used also in [8]. The
fundamental idea here is to construct a small perturbation of the data point x in order to force the
method to mis-classify the training example x with some incorrect label y′.
In [7], the authors point out that when the dimension d is large, changing each entry of x by a small
value  yields a perturbation ∆x (such that ‖∆x‖∞ = ), which can significantly change the inner-
product product wTx of x with a weight vector w. Their result then chooses to set the adversarial
perturbation
∆x = sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)). (2)
An alternative formulation of the problem naturally shows how the adversarial perturbation ∆x was
obtained. If we take a first-order approximation of the loss function around the true training example
x with a small perturbation ∆x
Jθ,y(x+ ∆x) ≈ Jθ,y(x) + 〈∇Jθ,y(x),∆x〉,
and maximize the right hand size with respect to ∆x restricted to an `∞ ball of radius  we have
that the choice that maximizes the right-hand side is exactly the quantity in equation 2. Since the
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gradient ∇xJ(θ, x, y) can be computed efficiently using backpropagation (see, for example, [19]),
this approach for generating adversarial examples is rather fast. In the sequel we will show how the
above computation in an example of the framework that we present here.
It is reported in [21, 7] that adversarial examples that were generated for a specific network were
mis-classified in a similar fashion by other networks, with possibly different architectures and using
different subsets of the data for training. In [7] the authors claim that this phenomenon is related to
the strong linear nature that neural networks have. Specifically, they claim that the different models
learned by these neural nets were essentially all close to the same linear model, hence giving similar
predictions on adversarial examples.
Two works [15, 6] nicely demonstrate that classifiers can achieve very high test accuracy without
actually learning the true concepts of the classes they predict. Rather, they can base their predictions
on discriminative information, which suffices to obtain accurate predictions on test data, however
does not reflect learning of the true concept that defines specific classes. As a result, they can
consistently fail in recognizing the true class concept in new examples [6] or confidently give wrong
predictions on specifically designed examples [15].
Several papers propose training procedures and objective functions designed to make the function
computed by the ANN change more slowly near training and test points. In [21] adversarial ex-
amples were generated and fed back to the training set. This procedure is reported to increase the
classification accuracy on test data. In [7] the following loss function is proposed:
J˜(θ, x, y) = αJ(θ, x, y) + (1− α)J(θ, x+ ∆x, y), (3)
with ∆x as in equation (2). The authors report that the resulting net had improved test set accuracy,
and also had better performance on new adversarial examples. They further give intuitive explana-
tions of this training procedure being an adversary game, and a min-max optimization over `∞ balls.
In this manuscript, we attempt to make the second interpretation rigor, by deriving a similar training
procedure from RO framework.
In [12] adversarial training is performed without requiring knowledge of the true label. Rather,
the loss function contains a term computing the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the predicted
distributions of the label, (e.g., softmax) i.e. KL(p(y|x)||p(y|x+ ∆x)).
In [9] adversarial examples were generated for music data. The authors report that back-feeding
of adversarial examples to the training set did not result in an improved resistance to adversarial
examples.
In [17], the authors first pre-train each layer of the network as a contractive autoencoder [18], which,
assuming that the data concentrates near a lower dimensional manifold, penalizes the Jacobian of
the encoder at every training point x, so that the encoding changes only in the directions tangent
to the manifold at x. The authors further assume that points belonging to different classes tend to
concentrate near different sub-manifolds, separated by low density areas. Consequently, they en-
courage the output of a classification network to be constant near every training point, by penalizing
the dot product of the network’s gradient with the basis vectors of the plain that is tangent to the data
manifold at every training point. This is done by using the loss function
J˜(θ, x, y) = J(θ, x, y) + β
∑
u∈Bx
(〈u,∇xo(x)〉)2, (4)
where o(x) is the output of the network at x and Bx is the basis of the hyperplane that is tangent
to the data manifold at x. In the sequel we will show how this is related to the approach in this
manuscript.
The contractive autoencoder loss is also used in [8], where the authors propose to increase the
robustness of an ANN via minimization of a loss function which contains a term that penalizes the
Jacobians of the function computed by each layer with respect to the previous layer.
In [21], the authors propose to regularize ANNs by penalizing the operator norm of the weight
matrix of every layer. Such thing which will lead to pushing the Lipschitz constant of the function
computed by a layer down, so that small perturbations in input will not result in large perturbations
in output. We are not aware of any empirical result using this approach.
A different approach is taken in [16], using scattering convolutional networks (convnets), having
wavelets based filters. The filters are fixed, i.e., not learned from the data, and are designed to obtain
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stability under rotations and translations. The learned representation is claimed to be stable also
under small deformations created by additive noise. However, the performance of the network is
often inferior to standard convnets, which are trained in a supervised fashion.
Interesting theoretical arguments are presented in [6], where it is shown that robustness of any
classifier to adversarial examples depends on the distinguishability between the classes; they show
that sufficiently large distinguishability is a necessary condition for any classifier to be robust to
adversarial perturbations. Distinguishability is expressed, for example, by distance between means
in case of linear classifiers and and between covariance matrices in the case of quadratic classifiers.
3 Robust Optimization
Solutions to optimization problems can be very sensitive to small perturbations in the input data
of the optimization problem, in the sense that an optimal solution given the current data may turn
into a highly sub-optimal or even infeasible solution given a slight change in the data. A desirable
property of an optimal solution is to remain nearly optimal under small perturbations of the data.
Since measurement data is typically precision-limited and might contain errors, the requirement for
a solution to be stable to input perturbations becomes essential.
Robust Optimization (RO, see, for example [1]) is an area of optimization theory which aims to
obtain solutions which are stable under some level of uncertainty the data. The uncertainty has
a deterministic and worst-case nature. The assumption is that the perturbations to the data can be
drawn from specific sets Ui called uncertainty sets. The uncertainty sets are often defined in terms of
the type of the uncertainty and a parameter controlling the size of the uncertainty set. The Cartesian
product of the sets Ui is usually denoted by U .
The goal in Robust Optimization is to obtain solutions which are feasible and well-behaved under
any realization of the uncertainty from U ; among feasible solutions, an optimal one would be such
that has the minimal cost given the worst-case realization from U . Robust Optimization problems
thus usually have a min-max formulation, in which the objective function is being minimized with
respect to a worst-case realization of a perturbation. For example, consider standard linear program-
ming problem
min
x
{cTx : Ax ≤ b}. (5)
The given data in this case is (A, b, c) and the goal is to obtain a solution x which is robust to
perturbations in the data. Clearly, no solution can be well-behaved if the perturbations of the data
can be arbitrary. Hence, we restrict ourselves to only allowing the perturbations to exist in in the
uncertainty set U . The corresponding Robust Optimization formulation is
min
x
sup
(A,b,c)∈U
{cTx : Ax ≤ b}. (6)
Thus, the goal of the above problem is to pick an x that can work well for all possible instances of
the problem parameters within the uncertainty set.
The robust counterpart of an optimization problem can sometimes be more complicated to solve
than the original problem. [13] and [2] propose algorithms for approximately solving the robust
problem, which are based only on the algorithm for the original problem. This approach is closely
related to the algorithm we propose in this manuscript.
In the next section we discuss the connection between Robust Optimization and regularization.
Regularization serves an important role in Deep Learning architectures, with methods such as
dropout [22] and sparsification (for example, [3]) serving as a few examples.
3.1 Robust Optimization and Regularization
Robust Optimization is applied in various settings in statistics and machine learning, including,
for example, several parameter estimation applications. In particular, there is a strong connection
between Robust Optimization and regularization; in several cases it was shown that solving a reg-
ularized problem is equivalent to obtaining a Robust Optimization solution for a non-regularized
problem. For example, it was shown in [24] that a solution to a `1 regularized least squares problem
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min
x
‖Ax− b‖+ λ‖x‖1 (7)
is also a solution to the Robust Optimization problem
min
x
max
‖∆A|∞,2≤ρ
‖(A+ ∆A)x− b‖, (8)
where ‖ · ‖∞,2 is the `∞ norm of the `2 norms of the columns [4]. As a result, it was shown [24]
that sparsity of the solution xopt is a consequence of its robustness. Regularized Support Vector
Machines (SVMs) were also shown to have robustness properties: in [25] it was shown that solu-
tions to SVM with norm regularization can be obtained from non-regularized Robust Optimization
problems [4]. Finally, Ridge Regression can also be viewed as a variant of a robust optimization
problem. Namely, it can be shown that
min
x
max
{∆:‖∆‖F≤γ}
‖(A+ ∆)x− b‖2
is equivalent to minx ‖Ax− b‖2 + γ‖x‖2 [20].
4 The Proposed Training Framework
Inspired by the Robust Optimization paradigm, we propose a loss function for training ANNs. Our
approach is designed to make the network’s output stable in a small neighborhood around every
training point xi; this neighborhood corresponds to the uncertainty set Ui. For example, we may
set Ui = Bρ(xi, r), a ball with radius r around xi with respect to some norm ρ. To do so, we
select from this neighborhood a representative x˜i = xi + ∆xi , which is the point on which the
network’s output will induce the greatest loss; we then require the network’s output on x˜i to be yi,
the target output for xi. Assuming that many test points are indeed close to training points from the
same class, we expect that this training algorithm will have a regularization effect and consequently
will improve the network’s performance on test data. Furthermore, since adversarial examples are
typically generated in proximity to training or test points, we expect this approach to increase the
robustness of the network’s output to adversarial examples.
We propose training the network using a minimization-maximization approach to optimize:
min
θ
J˜(θ, x, y) = min
θ
m∑
i=1
max
x˜i∈Ui
J(θ, x˜i, yi), (9)
where Ui is the uncertainty set corresponding to example i. This can be viewed as optimizing the
network parameters θ with respect to a worst-case data {(x˜i, yi)}, rather than to the original training
data; the i’th worst-case data point is chosen from the uncertainty set Ui. The uncertainty sets are
determined by the type of uncertainty and can be selected based on the problem at hand.
Optimization of (9) can be done in a standard iterative fashion, where in each iteration of the al-
gorithm two optimization sub-procedures are performed. First, the network parameters θ are held
fixed and for every training example xi an additive adversarial perturbation ∆xi is selected such that
xi + ∆xi ∈ Ui and
∆xi = arg max
∆:xi+∆∈Ui
Jθ,yi(xi + ∆). (10)
Then, the network parameters θ are updated with respect to the perturbed data {(x˜i, yi)}, where x˜i =
xi + ∆xi . This maximization is related to the adversarial example generation process previously
proposed by Szegedy et. al. [21] as shown in equation (1).
Clearly, finding the exact ∆xi in Equation (10) is intractable in general. Furthermore, performing a
full optimization process in each of these sub-procedures in each iteration is not practical. Hence,
we propose to minimize a surrogate to J˜ , in which each sub-procedure is reduced to a single ascent
/ descent step; that is, in each iteration, we perform a single ascent step (for each i) to find an
approximation ∆ˆxi for ∆xi , followed by a single descent step to update θ. The surrogate that we
consider is the first-order Taylor expansion of the loss around the example, which yields:
∆ˆxi ∈ arg max
∆:xi+∆∈Ui
Jθ,yi(xi) + 〈∇Jθ,yi(x),∆〉. (11)
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Algorithm 1 Adversarial Training
Input: {(xi, yi)}mi=1
Output: robust parameter vector θ
initialize θ
while θ not converged do
for every mini batch mb do
for i = 1, .., |mb| do
Compute ∆ˆxi using a single ascent step to approximate ∆xi via equation (11)
Set x˜i ← xi + ∆ˆxi
end for
Update θ using a single descent step with respect to the perturbed data {(x˜i, yi)}|mb|i=1
end for
end while
Our proposed training procedure is formalized in Algorithm 1. In words, the algorithm performs
alternating ascent and descent steps, where we first ascend for each i with respect to the training
example xi and descend with respect to network parameters θ.
Note that under this procedure, θ is never updated with respect to the original training data; rather, it
is always updated with respect to worst-case examples which are close to the original training points
with respect to the uncertainty sets Ui. In the sequel, we will remark on how to solve equation (11)
for special cases of Ui. In general, one could use an algorithm like L-BFGS or projected gradient
descent [14].
Finally, note that in each iteration of the algorithm two forward and backward passes through the
network are performed, one using the original training data to compute the adversarial perturbations
x˜i and one using the perturbed data to compute the update for θ; hence, we expect the training time
to be twice as long, comparing to standard training.
4.1 Examples of uncertainty sets
There is a number of cases that one can consider for the uncertainty sets Ui. One example is when
Ui = Bρ(xi, r), a norm ball centered at xi with radius r with respect to the norm ρ. Some interesting
choices for ρ are the `∞, `1 and `2 norms. Thus, ∆xi can then be approximated using normalized
steepest ascent step with respect to the norm ρ [5]. The steepest ascent step with respect to the `∞
ball (i.e., box) is obtained by the sign of the gradient sign∇Jθ,yi(xi). Choosing ∆xi from an `∞ ball
will therefore yield a perturbation in which every entry of x is changed by the same amount r. The
steepest ascent with respect to the `2 ball coincides with the direction of the gradient ∇Jθ,yi(xi).
Choosing ∆xi from an `1 ball will yield a sparse perturbation, in which only one or a small number
of the entries of xi are changed (those of largest magnitude in∇Jθ,yi(xi)). Observe that in all three
cases the steepest ascent direction is derived from the gradient ∇Jθ,yi(xi), which can be computed
efficiently using backpropagation. In Section 5 we use each of the `1,`2,`∞ norms to generate
adversarial examples by Equation (11) and compare the performance of Algorithm 1 using each of
these types of uncertainty sets.
4.2 Relation to previous works
The loss function in equation (3), which is proposed in [7], can be viewed as a variant of our ap-
proach, in which ∆xi is chosen from an `∞ ball around xi, since θ is updated with respect to
adversarial examples generated by equation (2), which is the steepest ascent step with respect to the
`∞ norm. Namely, we simply see that the solution to equation (11) for the case that Ui = B`∞(xi, )
is the update presented in equation (2).
We may also relate our proposed methodology to the Manifold Tangent Classifier loss function [17].
Following their assumption, suppose that the data exists on a low-dimension smooth manifold Γ ⊂
Rd. Let the uncertainty set for training sample x be U = Γ⋂B`2(x, r). Thus, we would like to
obtain the perturbation ∆x by solving ∆x = supx+δ∈U Jθ,y(x + δ) Again, we take a first-order
Taylor approximation of Jθ,y(x) around x and obtain Jθ,y(x+ δ) ≈ Jθ,y(x) + 〈δ,∇xJθ,y(x)〉. We
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then obtain ∆ˆx through the optimization
∆ˆx = arg max
∆:x+∆∈U
Jθ,y(x) + 〈∇xJθ,y(x),∆〉 (12)
Recalling that Γ is locally Euclidean, denoting by Bx the basis for the hyperplane that is tangent to
Γ at x and given that r is sufficiently small, we may rewrite equation (12) as
arg max
∆∈spanBx, ‖∆‖2≤r
Jθ,y(x) + 〈∇xJθ,y(x),∆〉, (13)
The solution to the above equation is ∆x ∝ ΠBx∇xJθ,y(x), where ΠBx is the orthogonal projection
matrix onto the subspace Bx and ∆x should have `2 norm equal to r. Thus, this acts as an `2
regularization of the gradient of the loss with respect to the training sample x, projected along the
tangent space Bx, which is analogous to the regularization presented in equation (4). Put another
way, small perturbations of x on the tangent manifold Bx should cause very small changes to the
loss, which in turn should result in small perturbations of the output of network on input x.
5 Experimental Results
In this section we experiment with our proposed training algorithm on two popular benchmark
datasets: MNIST [11] and CIFAR-10 [10]. In each case we compare the robustness of a network
that was trained using Algorithm 1 to that of a network trained in a standard fashion.
5.1 Experiments on MNIST dataset
As a baseline, we trained a convnet with ReLU units, two convolutional layers (containing 32 and 64
5×5 filters), max pooling (3×3 and 2×2 ) after every convolutional layer, and two fully connected
layers (of sizes 200 and 10) on top. This convnet had 99.09% accuracy on the MNIST test set. We
refer to this network as “the baseline net”. We then used the baseline net to generate a collection of
adversarial examples, using equation (11), with `1, `2 and `∞ norm balls.
Specifically, the adversarial perturbation was computed by a step in the steepest ascent direction
w.r.t the corresponding norm. The step w.r.t to `∞ uncertainty set is the same as the fast method of
[7]; the step w.r.t to `2 uncertainty set is in the direction of the gradient; the steepest ascent direction
w.r.t to `1 uncertainty sets comes down to changing the pixel corresponding to the entry of largest
magnitude in the gradient vector. It is interesting to note that using equation (11) with `1 uncertainty,
it is possible to make a network mis-classify an image by changing only a single pixel. Several such
examples are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Adversarial examples that were generated for the MNIST dataset w.r.t to the baseline net,
via equation (11) with `1 uncertainty. Top row: original test examples. Bottom row: adversarial
examples, where a single pixel (circled) was changed. All original examples presented here were
correctly classified by the baseline net, all adversarial examples were mis-classified.
Altogether we generated a collection of 1203 adversarial examples, on which the baseline network
had zero accuracy and which were generated from correctly classified test points. A sample of the
adversarial examples is presented in Figure 2. We refer to this collection as Amnist.
We then used Algorithm 1 to re-train the net with the norm ρ being `1, `2 and `∞ (each norm in
a different experiment). We refer to the resulting nets as the robustified nets. Table 1 summarizes
the accuracy of each robustified net on the mnist test data and the collection Amnist of adversarial
examples.
As can be seen, all three robustified nets classify correctly many of the adversarial examples in
Amnist, with the `∞ uncertainty giving the best performance. In addition, all three robustified nets
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Figure 2: A sample from the set Amnist of adversarial examples, generated via equation (11). Top
row: original test examples (correctly classified by the baseline net). Bottom row: adversarial
examples (mis-classified).
Table 1: Accuracy of the baseline net and each of the three robustified nets on the original MNIST
test data, and on the set Amnist of adversarial examples that were generated w.r.t to the baseline net.
Net MNIST test set Amnist
Baseline 99.09% 0%
Robust `1 99.16% 33.83%
Robust `2 99.28% 76.55%
Robust `∞ 99.33% 79.96%
improve the accuracy also on the original test data, i.e., the adversarial training acts as a regularizer,
which improves the network’s generalization ability. This observation is consistent with the ones in
[21] and [7].
Next, we checked whether it is harder to generate new adversarial examples from the robustified
nets (i.e., the nets that were trained via Algorithm 1) than from the baseline net. To do that, we used
the fast method of [7] (see equation (2)) with various values of  (which corresponds to the amount
of noise added/subtracted to/from each pixel) to generate adversarial examples for the baseline net,
and for the robustified nets. For each  we measured the classification accuracy of each net with
respect to adversarial examples that were generated from its own parameters. The results are shown
in Figure 3. Clearly, all three robustified nets are significantly more robust to generation of new
adversarial examples.
Figure 3: MNIST dataset experiment: comparison between the baseline net (trained in a standard
way) and the robustified nets (trained using Algorithm 1, with `1, `2 and `∞ uncertainty sets).
Adversarial examples were generated via Equation (2) with respect to each net for various values of
 and classification accuracy is plotted. As can be seen, the nets that were trained using Algorithm 1)
are significantly more robust to adversarial examples.
8
To summarize the MNIST experiment, we observed that networks trained with Algorithm 1 (1) have
improved performance on original test data, (2) have improved performance of original adversarial
examples that were generated w.r.t to the baseline net, and (3) are more robust to generation of new
adversarial examples.
5.2 Experiments on CIFAR-10 dataset
As a baseline net, we use a variant of the VGG net, publicly available online at [26], where we
disabled the batch-flip module, which flips half of the images in every batch. This baseline net
achieved accuracy of 90.79% on the test set.
As in section 5.1, we constructed adversarial examples for the baseline net, using Equation(11), with
`1, `2 and `∞ uncertainty sets. Altogether we constructed 1712 adversarial examples, all of which
were mis-classified by the baseline net, and were constructed from correctly classified test images.
We denote this set as Acifar10. A sample from Acifar10 is presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4: A sample from the set Acifar10 of adversarial examples. Some (pre-processed) original
CIFAR-10 test examples (top row) and their corresponding adversarial examples (bottom row) for
the baseline net. All original test examples are classified correctly by the baseline net while the
adversarial examples are all mis-classified. The adversarial examples shown here were generated
from the baseline net using equation (11) with `2 and `∞ uncertainties.
We then used Algorithm 1 to re-train the net with `1, `2 and `∞ uncertainty. Figure 5 shows that the
robustified nets take about the same number of epochs to converge as the baseline net.
Figure 5: CIFAR-10 dataset experiment: test accuracy vs. epoch number.
Table 2 compares the performance of the baseline and robustified nets on the CIFAR-10 test data
and the collection Acifar10 of adversarial examples.
Consistently with the results of the MNIST experiment, here as well the robustified nets classify
correctly many of the adversarial examples in Amnist, and also outperform the baseline net on the
original test data.
As in the MNIST experiment, we continued by checking whether it is harder to generate new ad-
versarial examples from the robustified nets than from the baseline net; we used equation (2) (i.e.,
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Table 2: Accuracy of the baseline and the `2 and `∞ robustified nets on the original CIFAR-10 test
data, and on the set Acifar10 of adversarial examples that were generated w.r.t to the baseline net.
Net CIFAR-10 test set Acifar10
Baseline 90.79% 0%
Robust `1 91.11% 56.31%
Robust `2 91.04% 59.92%
Robust `∞ 91.36% 65.01%
with `∞ uncertainty) and various values of  to generate adversarial examples for each of the the
baseline and the robustified nets. The results are shown in Figure 6. We can see that new adversarial
examples are consistently harder to generate for the robustified net, which is consistent with the
observation we had in the MNIST experiment.
Figure 6: CIFAR-10 dataset experiment: comparison between the baseline net (trained in a standard
way) and the robustified nets (trained using Algorithm 1, using `1, `2 and `∞ uncertainty). Ad-
versarial examples were generated via Equation (2) with respect to each net for various values of
 and classification accuracy is plotted. The robustified nets are more robust to generation of new
adversarial examples.
To summarize the CIFAR-10 experiment, we observed that here as well, the robustified nets improve
the performance on original test data, while making the nets more robust to generation of new
adversarial examples. As in the MNIST experiment, the `∞ uncertainty yields the best improvement
in test accuracy. In addition, the robustified nets require about the same number of parameter updates
to converge as the baseline net.
6 Conclusions
In an attempt to theoretically understand successful empirical results with adversarial training, we
proposed a framework for robust optimization of neural nets, in which the network’s prediction is
encouraged to be consistent in a small ball with respect to some norm. The implementation is done
using minimization-maximization approach, where the loss is minimized over worst-case examples,
rather than on the original data. Our framework explains previously reported empirical results,
showing that incorporating adversarial examples during training improves accuracy on test data. In
addition, we showed that the loss function published in [7] is in fact a special case of Algorithm 1,
for certain type of uncertainty, thus explaining intuitive interpretations given in that paper. We also
showed a connection between Algorithm 1 and the manifold tangent classifier [17], showing that it
too, corresponds to a robustification of ANN training.
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Experimental results in MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets show that Algorithm 1 indeed acts as a reg-
ularizer and improves the prediction accuracy also on the original test examples, and are consistent
with previous results in [7] and [21]. Furthermore, we showed that new adversarial examples are
harder to generate for a network that is trained using our proposed approach, comparing to a network
that was trained in a standard fashion. As a by-product, we also showed that one may be able to
make a neural net mis-classify a correctly-classified an image by changing only a single pixel.
Explaining the regularization effect that adversarial training has is in the same vein that from prac-
tical experience, most authors knew that drop-out (or more generally adding noise to data) acts as
regularization, without a formal rigor justification. Later (well-cited) work by Wager, Wang, and
Liang [22] created a rigorous connection between dropout and weighted ridge regression.
The scripts that were used for the experiments are available online at https://github.com/
yutaroyamada/RobustTraining .
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